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Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: 
Evidence from Turkey 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the relationship between context, internal corporate governance 
and firm performance, looking at the case of Turkey, an exemplar of family 
capitalism. We found more concentrated ownership, often in the hands of 
families, led to firms performing better; concentrated ownership means that 
controlling families bear more of the risks of poor performance. Less predictably, 
given that the institutional environment is so well attuned to family ownership, we 
found that mechanisms that accord room for a greater range of voices and interests 
within and beyond families – larger boards and foreign ownership stakes – seem 
to also make for positive performance effects. We also noted that increases in 
cross ownership did not influence market performance, but was negatively 
associated with accounting performance. Conversely, we found that a higher 
proportion of family members on boards had no discernable effect on 
performance. Our findings provide further insights on the relationship between the 
type of institutions encountered in many emerging markets, internal corporate 
governance configurations and firm performance.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance mechanisms; Institutions; Family capitalism; 
Firm performance; Emerging markets; Turkey. 
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Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: 
Evidence from Turkey 
 
1. Introduction 
This is a study of the effect of internal corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on firm 
performance in an emerging market setting where institutional arrangements are weak and 
fluid; it further explores whether any relationships follow on the lines of theories developed in 
the West, or are context specific. The existing CG literature emphasizes two different 
systems: Market-based (outsider) and relationship-based (insider) ones (Heenetigala, 2011; 
Bozec, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006; Hilb, 2006; Solomon & Solomon, 2004). 
The market-based or shareholder value system is mostly seen in Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the US and UK, where the protection of minority shareholders is robust, and there is a 
strong emphasis on maximizing shareholder value (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, the stakeholder orientated or relationship-based system is 
encountered in Continental Europe and parts of Latin America East Asia. Here, the role of the 
firm is much broader than maximizing shareholder profit, and that it seeks to benefit as wide a 
range of stakeholders as possible (Berghe, 2002; Dore, 2000; Demirbag, Wood, 
Makhmadshoev, & Rymkevich, 2017). There are also hybrid systems, such as Turkey, which 
combine some of the characteristics of each; this may translate to weak ownership rights, but 
not necessarily stronger countervailing rights for stakeholders (Banks, 2004).  
There is already an extensive body of literature on the relationship between ownership 
structure, board composition and attributes, and firm performance (Górriz & Fumás, 1996; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004; Maury, 2006; Chiang & Lin, 2007; 
Finegold Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Bauwhede, 2009; Singh & Gaur, 
2009; Lam & Lee, 2012). However, rather more contentious is the extent to which such 
relationships reflect general principles, such as an inherent ‘conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and managers’; how national institutional frameworks might impact on, mitigate 
or intensify any such tensions; and, indeed, whether alternative, potentially equally valid 
approaches to CG are valid, and indeed may work better in specific settings (c.f. Aguilera & 
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Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The existing literature on boards, ownership and performance has 
tended to concentrate on variations in internal CG mechanisms within liberal market 
frameworks, and on exploring the ways in which shareholder rights may be enforced to 
maximize shareholder value.  
It can be argued that these effects of internal CG arrangements may be amplified – and, 
hence, much more visible – in contexts with weak and fluid institutions, where external 
corporate governance arrangements are less effective (Dore, 2008). There has been growing 
interest in understanding how institutions operate, and the effects of variations in institutional 
coverage in emerging markets, and in contexts where family ownership is widespread (Witt & 
Redding, 2013). However, a limitation of much of the existing comparative institutional 
literature is that the firm is treated as something akin to a transmission belt with contextual 
features translating into performance outcomes (Wood, Deben, & Ogden, 2014). Yet, 
institutional arrangements directly impact on intra-organization governance and practice; 
hence, this study provides a close analysis of the relationship between institutions, internal 
corporate governance and performance, drawing out the linkages and interconnections 
between them. Moreover, examining the relationship between institution-specific CG 
influences and firm performance, measured using both accounting and market-based 
performance indicators provides a methodological contribution towards a better articulation of 
CG-firm performance  link in the context of an emerging market economy for which only a 
handful of studies have hitherto been conducted (Singh, Tabassum, Darwish, & Batsakis, 
2018). Finally, there has been growing interest in Turkey, a rapidly growing emerging market, 
but one where there has been increasing concerns as to the direction of institutional change 
(Karadag, 2010; Bugra & Savaskan, 2014).      
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief 
information on the development of CG in Turkey. Then, we review relevant literature and 
develop the study’s hypotheses. Research method is presented in Section 4, followed by 
results and discussion. Conclusion is given in the final section. 
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2. Corporate governance in Turkey 
Turkey is broadly of French legal origin (La Porta et al., 1997), but incorporates some 
Anglo-Saxon features. Examples of the latter would include monist (one-tier) board systems, 
that employees are generally not represented on boards, that organizations mostly act for the 
profit maximization of shareholders (stakeholder countervailing power is weak), whilst banks 
or financial institutions do not dominate business system through holding shares or voting 
rights unlike some European countries (Nilsson Okutan, 2007). However, Turkey’s security 
market is not broad enough and market capitalization is low compared to that of Anglo Saxon 
firms. Ownership structure is not widely dispersed (Atakan, Ozsoy, & Oba, 2008; Demirbag, 
Frecknall-Hughes, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2013). Property rights under the law are relatively 
weak (La Porta et al., 1997). Families in Turkey own 68 of the 100 largest traded companies 
and 53 percent of these families possess more than 50 percent of voting rights (Demirag & 
Serter, 2003). Usdiken, Yildirim-Oktem, and Senol (2015) claim that family ownership 
structure in Turkey has been observed since 1940s. Ararat and Ugur (2006) suggest 
controlling shareholders in Turkey maintain large stakes and leverage cash flow rights due to 
privileged shares and pyramidal ownership structures. This causes families hold the majority 
of shares of one more companies through pyramidal structure (Demirag & Serter, 2003). Due 
to large and limited number of shareholders in most businesses, Turkish business environment 
runs as a networking system rather than through formal contracts. Finally, the broadly civil 
law Turkish legal framework (La Porta et al., 1997) incorporates Anglo Saxon elements 
(Nilsson Okutan, 2007), but at most, is a hybrid-based system, rather than one that is 
shareholder rights orientated.  
The 1999 OECD Corporate Governance Principles required member countries 
(including Turkey) to take some initial steps to develop an appropriate CG code. In line with 
this suggestion, Turkey issued its first governance code in 2003. There were also various 
codes/principles issued voluntarily by the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s 
Association (TUSIAD), the Corporate Governance Association of Turkey (TKYD), and 
regulatory agencies such as the Capital Market Board (CMB) up until 2011. These codes were 
not compulsory and relied on ‘comply or explain’ rule. The CMB was designated by the 
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Turkish Government as a formal authority in charge of both issuing and mandating CG rules 
in 2011. This development was important because until that time there were no centralized 
structure and no obligation for publicly traded firms who were not willing to adopt CG codes. 
The CMB’s first code, the Communiqué No. 54, brought forward some compulsory rules; this 
was followed on by three further codes, Communiqués No. 56, No. 57, and No. 60, based on 
suggestions from public and private companies, but also due to complications arising from the 
application of the existing CG Code. Finally, the CG principles were updated via 
Communiqué No. 17, in 2014, in order to comply with the new Turkish Commercial Code, 
which came into effect in 2012. This new version of CG code brought some compulsory and 
advisory resolutions regarding the composition of board of directors and shareholders.  
It is widely acknowledged that there have been some significant institutional 
developments since 2003 regarding the development of internal and external CG mechanisms 
established by the regulatory authorities: The Turkish CG Code was issued; Turkish 
Commercial Code revised; Public Oversight Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority 
founded; Turkish Accounting and Financial Reporting Standards were issued; and the Capital 
Market Board made some serious changes to increase transparency. Although Turkey has 
experienced major institutional reforms, Turkey nevertheless shares almost all of the salient 
features of many emerging market CG regimes, including weak institutions (uneven law 
enforcement, shareholder and creditor protection), pyramidal business groups, dual class 
shares and concentrated family ownership (Demirag & Serter, 2003). 
 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
3.1. Institution-specific CG influences 
There are many different strands of institutional theory, from micro level sociological 
approaches, which focus primarily on internal organizational dynamics (Di Maggio & Powell, 
1991) to macro level economic and socio-economic approaches that seek to link firm behavior 
to wider societal realities. A key concern of the former is on the embeddedness of 
organizational processes and routines, and how these are legitimized (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996); meanwhile the latter concentrates on the relationship between societal level institutions 
6 
 
– and the dominant patterns they assume – and firm level practices (Wood et al., 2014). 
However, there has been a convergence across the different strands of institutional theory 
around the recognition of the central role of shared bodies of meaning, systems, regulations 
and governance (ibid.). Again, institutional theory seeks to explain both stability in, and 
commonalities between organizations, and how and why systemic and firm level change 
happens (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). This study centers on the relationship between 
contextual dynamics and intra-firm practice. Hence, it focuses on both on how national level 
institutions and the associated investment ecosystem impact on internal CG, and how the 
latter may be associated with persistent modes of behavior reflecting internal and external 
dynamics.   
Whilst sharing these concerns with other strands of institutional analysis, the literature 
on comparative capitalism specifically focuses on the relationship between national level 
institutional realities, the extent and density of ties between key societal actors, dominant 
modes of CG and intra-firm practices (Wood et al., 2014). The initial concern of such theories 
was with the advanced coordinated (e.g. Germany, Japan and Scandinavia) and liberal market 
economies (e.g. US and UK) (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007). 
Initially, it was felt that emerging markets would evolve towards one or other of these models 
(ibid). However, there is growing evidence that emerging markets are not so much evolving 
towards one of the more mature models of capitalism, but rather constitute quite durable and 
distinct orders. Change may be slowed by complementarity, even if the latter are partial and 
skewed to benefit insider players (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2016). Based on an 
extensive evaluation of socio-economic features, Witt and Redding (2013) argue that neither 
the shareholder nor stakeholder dominant archetypes accurately describe family firm 
dominated economies (Tabalujan, 2002; Witt & Redding, 2013; Hoskisson, Wright, 
Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). 
Liu, Yang, and Zhang (2012) note that whilst the literature on family firms has been 
dominated by agency and resource-based perspectives, institutions impact on how and where 
family ownership predominates and how it affects performance. They suggest that 
contradictory evidence on the relative performance of family businesses is in part a function 
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of a failure to account for institutional effects (ibid.).  Similarly, as Carney (2005) notes, much 
of the literature on family firms – and contexts where family firms predominate – focuses on 
the resource-based view; however, it has been supplemented by a growing body of work that 
brings institutional analysis to bear. Again, Church (1993) argues that it is not possible to 
understand family firms without taking account of time and place: National institutions and 
cultures will have a much greater effect than formal structures.   
Existing institutional accounts on family capitalism would place Turkey squarely within 
this category (Karadag, 2010). Indeed, it could be argued that this feature has been amplified 
in recent years; large commercial and industrial families have secured ever greater influence, 
capitalizing on recent political developments and associated regulatory changes (Karadag, 
2010). The latter have opened up new opportunities for leading families to maximize the 
returns accruing to them, concentrating ownership and control, leaving other interests much 
worse off (Bugra & Savaskan, 2014). Ownership concentration is associated with powerful 
families and other players, who will have access to more extensive and deeper networks, 
which can be harnessed to optimize performance (ibid.). Again, as there are fewer 
opportunities for risk to be offloaded on outsiders, it can be argued that ownership 
concentration represents the optimal corporate governance arrangement in contexts such as 
Turkey, where institutions are relatively weak (Heugens, Van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 
2009). Hence:  
  
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive association between ownership concentration and firm 
performance.  
 
Secondly, there is the issue of cross ownership. A major function of cross ownership is 
that it allows minority shareholders to maintain control, whilst only holding a relatively small 
proportion of equity. In other words, it allows insiders control despite only holding a small 
proportion of cash flow rights (Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000). Hence, it may enable 
organizations to fend off the concerns of non-insider shareholders, leaving the latter worse off 
(ibid.). In contexts where family ownership is widespread, it may be a vehicle through which 
8 
 
families may collaborate, promoting insider interests at the expense of outsiders. For example, 
cross ownership may enable families to reallocate costs and returns, leaving disempowered 
non-family shareholders much worse off (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Cross ownership enables 
businesses to be captured by families for a disproportionately modest investment, to provide 
job opportunities for relatives, for prestige reasons, and/or to cross subsidies other businesses 
where family members have a larger stake.   
From an institutional perspective, the relative utility of cross ownership is closely bound 
up with contextual dynamics (Peng & Jiang, 2010; La Porta, LopezdeSilanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). When institutions are relatively closely coupled, to make for effective market 
coordination, cross ownership may allow for cross- and inter- industry sharing of knowledge 
and capabilities, the enhancing of sectoral wide skills development and collective bargaining 
arrangements, and the support of the agendas of longer term investors (Peng & Jian, 1999). 
However, when institutional arrangements are less effective, and/or more weakly coupled, 
cross ownership may yield few of these benefits; rather, the widespread usage of cross 
ownership is likely to be a reflection of systemic failings, of the inability of non-family 
shareholders to enforce their rights (La Porta et al., 1999). In such settings, institutional 
functionality is partial and geared to serving specific insider interests only (Wood & Frynas, 
2006). Here, it is particularly likely that insiders will manipulate cross ownership in order to 
shift costs between firms, leaving most, worse off to benefit a favored few. As noted above, it 
may be used to grant relatives sinecures in firms where there are significant minority 
shareholders, and/or as a vehicle to support family empire building ambitions. In such 
instances, the organization will end up performing significantly worse than it otherwise would 
have. The Turkish institutional environment provides relatively fertile ground for cross 
ownership, again, given the relative weakness of investor rights (La Porta et al., 1997), and 
the political clout of leading families (Karadag, 2010). Hence:     
  
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative association between the share of cross ownership and firm 
performance. 
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It can be argued that systems based on personal familial relations functionally optimally 
if formal contractual rights are weak and the pool of investment capital is limited; personal 
ties assume greater importance in such settings (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). However, as 
systems modernize, this may result in capital misallocation. On the one hand, family capitalist 
systems may be poorly equipped to cope with sufficient capital inflows from abroad (ibid.). 
On the other hand, investors from abroad may be better equipped to cope with systemic 
change, as they may have experience of the latter in a range of different national contexts. As 
their commitment to the existing order may be weaker, they also be more inclined to promote 
the adoption of best practices from abroad (Brewster, Wood, & Brookes, 2008). Again, if 
family owned firms are supported by strong domestic networks of relationships (Fainshmidt 
et al., 2016), they may be less experienced in optimizing more transactional or “arm’s length” 
relationships encountered in the advanced societies (Wood et al., 2014). Investors from 
abroad may be able to bring with them the kind of knowledge and experience of the latter that 
supplements the in-depth understanding of working in family based networks. Existing work 
on inward FDI to Turkey from an institutional perspective suggests that incoming firms tend 
to draw on their developed internal capabilities and strengths in compensating for institutional 
shortfalls at contextual level, and in doing so, pioneering higher value added practices 
(Collings, Demirbag, Mellahi, Tatoglu, & Wood, 2014; Dumludag, 2009). Again, if MNEs 
from institutionally advanced contexts are likely to be subject more robust country of origin 
regulation, then this would suggest that they will be more effective in protecting the interests 
of investors. Indeed, in looking at the case of Turkey, Alpay, Bodur, Ener, and Talug (2005) 
found that MNEs were likely to have uphold better corporate governance standards. This 
leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive association between the share of foreign ownership and firm 
performance.  
 
Within Turkey, shortfalls in formal regulation and political developments have opened 
up a void which has been filled by family interests, who have capitalized on the opportunities 
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for their own advancement (Karadag, 2010); in turn, this vests internal corporate governance 
checks and balances with greater significance (Kula, 2005). Carney (2005) argues that family 
control is associated with three types of propensity: Personalism, parsimony, and 
particularism. This may optimize social capital and encourage opportunism in investment. 
There are three dimensions of family capitalism that impact on CG. Firstly, the corporate unit 
as a legal actor may be difficult to disentangle from family interests (Tabalujan, 2002). 
Company assets are under omnipresent threat of expropriation by family members. Secondly, 
there is the issue of accountability: Family members may feel more accountable to the family 
rather than to shareholders or company officers (ibid.). Thirdly, family members may 
undermine formal lines of authority and supervision (Tabalujan, 2002). Larger boards may 
dilute these effects: At the very least, consensus will have to be forged between key family 
factions (Topak, 2011), and it may make it easier for professional managers to exert their 
influence (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). Thus, we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4. There is a positive association between board size and firm performance. 
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that if decision-making is concentrated in the hands 
of family members, personal ties and loyalties may trump commercial exigencies (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). Significant representation of outsiders on boards may allow for the infusion of 
fresh ideas, and temper deep-seated family loyalties (ibid). In other words, even if family 
ownership may work relatively well in specific settings, it imposes costs; if family based 
networks are open, rather than closed to fresh ideas, the system may work much better 
(Johannisson & Huse, 2000). There is much evidence to suggest that family ownership is a 
relatively efficient model in contexts where institutions are relatively weak (Fainshmidt et al., 
2016). If left to their own devices, commercial and industrial families may forge solutions 
most appropriate to their context. Again, it has been argued that in Turkey, institutional 
shortfalls mean that firms often are forced to buy the support or acquiescence of local power 
holders, such as ex-politicians, bureaucrats and military officers through sinecures at board 
level (Ararat, Orbay, & Yurtoglu, 2010). Such board members may add little beyond this, 
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and, indeed, leverage their position to demand additional rents. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 5. There is a positive association between the proportion of family board 
members and firm performance. 
 
3.2. Control variables 
When institutions are incompatible, there is a contestation for supremacy; the lack of a 
clear and mutually supportive system will open up room for family owned businesses to 
devise solutions of their own (Leaptrott, 2005). Van Essen, Strike, Carney, and Sapp (2015) 
find that when investor protection and institutional effectiveness is weaker, family owned 
firms are particularly likely outperform non-family firms during times of crisis. This would 
suggest that a family ownership stake diminishes; these beneficial effects will be less 
pronounced. Again, public ownership subjects firms to greater scrutiny, which may make it 
harder for dominant families to forge deals based on their extended networks. Hence, we 
control for the proportion of publicly held shares, as this will dilute the material stake families 
have in firms, which may diminish performance.     
We also control for the effects of the proportion of independent and non-executive 
directors and CEO duality, given that these are indicators of relative board independence 
(Chiang & He, 2010). However, we anticipate these effects may be slight. The fact of CEO 
duality tells us little as to whether s/he is a family member or not, which may exert a stronger 
effect on managerial-board relations.  
We also incorporated the following additional control variables: Female board 
representation, executive board membership, proportion of publicly held shares, CG index, 
leverage, firm age, firm size, industry and group affiliation (details provided in method 
section). These control variables are classified under three main categories: Board specific 
controls, CG infrastructure specific controls and firm specific controls.  
Figure 1 delineates the research framework of the hypothesized relationships along with 
the control variables. 
[Figure 1] 
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4. Research method 
4.1. Sample 
Our sampling frame includes the firms listed in Borsa Istanbul (BIST). As of May 2013, 
the number of firms listed in BIST was 428. These firms are categorized with respect to their 
market definitions and requirements, which are shown in Appendix 1. The market conditions 
are determined in accordance with listing requirements, such as firm size and sector. After 
excluding firms that do not meet the listing requirements of BIST and that are not freely 
traded, we confine our sample to 234 firms (55 percent). Furthermore, in line with previous 
studies (Earle, Kucsera, & Telegdy, 2005; Rose, 2007; Setia-Atmaja, 2009), financial 
institutions are excluded from the dataset because of their different financial reporting 
standards (Jackling & Johl, 2009). Following the elimination of financial firms, our sample 
finally includes 210 firms that account for 49 percent of listed firms on the BIST.  
The data about these companies cover the period of 2010-2013 and are compiled from a 
wide variety of channels. (1) Central Registry Agency; (2) annual reports of firms; (3) 
external audit reports; (4) corporate web pages of firms; (5) Public Disclosure Platform, and 
(6) a personal direct contacts with to mailing or calling a firm’s investor relations department. 
Most of the data, especially on board attributes, were hand-collected from above channels. 
There were some limitations to the data collection process owing to some missing variables 
(e.g., CEO duality, executive and independent board membership), as firms have no legal 
obligation to disclose information on them. These limitations constitute the key reason to 
confine our time frame to the period of 2010-2013. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the 
sample. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
4.2. Variable definitions and measurement 
The following subsections include the definitions and measurements of the variables 
used in the study. 
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4.2.1. Dependent variable 
This study uses Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA) as dependent variables, which 
are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; 
Jackling & Johl, 2009; Chen & Nowland, 2010; O’Connor, Kinsella, & O’Sullivan, 2014). In 
fact, relying on a single performance indicator may be specious. For instance, Dalton et al. 
(1999) highlight limitations on the usage of accounting performance measures, as they may be 
subject to manipulation, and variations in accounting and consolidation methods. Conversely, 
Muller (2014) claims that market-based measures of performance may be affected by investor 
anticipation. In the light of this, we use both accounting and market based performance 
measures1. 
ROA is an accounting performance indicator, defined as the percentage of net income to 
total assets. The ROA shows a firm’s operational performance for a specific period (mostly 
one year) as a percentage of total assets. In this study, we select ROA over other similar 
performance indicators – ROE and ROIC – owing to limitations in the latter; for example, in 
Turkey firms’ leverage ratios are usually higher than those in developed countries. 
Information for a ROA is obtained from a firm’s annual reports, including external audit 
reports. Annual reports are available from corporate web sites.  
Tobin’s Q is the market performance indicator defined as the percentage of market 
value of a firm to total assets. Hoon and Prather (2001) claim that Tobin’s Q is frequently 
regarded as a reliable measure indicating a firm’s performance based on its growth potential. 
We obtained market value, the denominator of Tobin’s Q, from the Central Registry Agency 
(MKK), which is the central securities depository for capital market instruments. Total assets 
are derived from the financial statements of firms, which are obtained in the same way as the 
ROA.  
 
                                                 
1
 Although the accounting measures of performance (e.g. price earnings measures) might also be used like 
Tobin’s Q, the latter provides a rather more realistic measure when evaluating the market performance of firms 
in emerging countries like Turkey where the capital markets are not as broad and deep as in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. It is also well acknowledged in the extant literature that the use of accounting-based measures of 
performance is subject to serious shortcomings stemming largely from differences in systematic risk, tax laws 
and accounting conventions concerning inventory valuation, R&D and advertising, and is likely to differ across 
industries creating estimation bias in favor of industry effects (see Singh et al. (2018) for a detailed review). 
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4.2.2. Independent variables 
We used the following institution specific CG influences as independent variables to 
examine their impact on firm performance.  
Ownership concentration (CONCEN) is measured as the percentage of shares held in 
blocks of 5 percent, or more (Tuschke & Sanders, 2003; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014). 
Cross ownership (C-OWN) is measured by the percentage of corporate shareholders to 
total shares (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Dietzenbacher & Temurshoev, 2008).  
Foreign ownership (F-OWN) is measured using the percentage of foreign investor 
shares to total shares (Aydin, Sayim, & Yalama, 2007).  
Board size (B-SIZE) is measured by the number of directors appointed on board 
(Chiang & Lin, 2007; Perrini, Rossi & Rovetta, 2008; Mobbs, 2015).  
Family board membership (B-FML) involves the presence of family board members. It 
is calculated by the percentage of family directors divided by the total number of directors 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Ehikioya, 2009). 
The first three variables of CONCEN, C-OWN and F-OWN were acquired from the 
MKK, while B-SIZE and B-FML were obtained from the firm’s annual reports. Annual 
reports can be obtained either from a firm’s corporate web site or through the Public 
Disclosure Platform. In some cases, mostly where there is a lack of data or data that is not 
clear in the annual reports, data was requested from firms by phone or mail.  
 
 
4.2.3. Board specific controls   
Women board membership (B-WMN) refers to the presence of women on boards, 
measured as the percentage of women directors on a board. Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008) stress that the gender composition of a board can affect the quality of the controlling 
role and firm performance especially in countries where external mechanisms are less well 
developed. The presence of women on board has been associated with better monitoring, 
which will impact on firm values (Schnake, Williams, & Fredenberger, 2006; Nielsen & 
Huse, 2010; Isidro & Sobral, 2015). 
15 
 
Executive board membership (B-EXE) represents the percentage of executive board 
members. Directors, who are responsible for an administrative task in the firm’s daily 
routines, while being a board member, can be defined as executive board members. Previous 
studies emphasize the relative importance of executive directors, suggesting that they 
contribute to available expertise, and facilitate more open discussion within management 
(Donaldson, 1990; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). In their study of Turkish banks, Kaymak and 
Bektas (2008) found a positive relationship between executive board members and firm 
performance. 
Independent board membership (B-IND) is the percentage of independent and non-
executive board members. It is measured as the percentage of independent members of a 
board (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Singh et al., 2018).  
CEO duality (C-DUAL) or commonly board leadership is defined when a CEO is also 
chairperson of a board. CEO duality is measured using a dummy variable where “1” denotes 
whether the CEO also serves as a chairperson and “0” otherwise (Ehikioya, 2009; 
Veprauskaite & Adams, 2013).  
 
4.2.4. CG infrastructure specific controls   
Publicly held ownership (P-OWN) is calculated as the percentage of public shares to 
total shares. 
Corporate governance index (CG-IND) is used by BIST and involves quotations from 
firms who have proved to be compatible with the index requirements. CG-IND is measured 
by a dummy variable where “1” denotes firms listed in the CG index and “0” otherwise. The 
Public Disclosure Platform (www.kap.gov.tr) company notifications are partially used to 
obtain data about firms quoted on the CG index. 
 
4.2.5 Firm specific controls   
Leverage (LEV) affects firm performance either positively or negatively. According to 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), leverage is negatively associated with firm performance 
because a higher level of debt increases the risk of bankruptcy. In contrast, Jensen (1986) 
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notes a positive relationship between leverage and firm performance because high levels of 
debt decrease potential agency costs, which mean managers have less cash available after 
servicing the debt. 
Firm age (AGE) effects on firm performance are ambiguous. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) 
stress that the performance of younger firm is higher because younger firms are likely to have 
newer assets relative to mature firms; hence, they are more likely to be able to comply with 
environmental legislation and it easier for them to position themselves in the market on the 
basis of their environmental responsiveness. However, mature firms possess accumulated 
knowledge about the country, and market. Mature firms are likely to have built up a level of 
market share, which may be more difficult for younger firms to match. With experience, they 
may be more resistant to crises.  
Firm size (SIZE) also has an effect on firm performance. Zahra and Pearce (1989) and 
Su, Xu, and Phan (2008) posit that larger firms are more likely to have larger boards, which, 
in turn, lead to greater agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); hence, firm size is negatively 
associated with firm performance. On the other hand, Setia-Atmaja (2009) found a positive 
relationship between firm size and board independence. Mura (2007) explains that due to 
economies of scale, larger firms are expected to be more profitable. Larger firms can also 
access cheaper resources and funds.  
Industry (IND) is another contingent variable in our model. Firms in the manufacturing 
sector commonly invest in more machinery and equipment, while service sector firms use 
more funds for their advertisement and marketing expenditure.  
Group affiliation (GRP) is the last contingency variable. According to Zattoni, 
Pedersen, and Kumar (2009), a business group consists of individual firms with multiple links 
and they are coordinated to attain common goals. Singh and Gaur (2009) examined the top 
500 Indian and Chinese firms and found that the performance of group-affiliated firms was 
worse than unaffiliated firms. Zattoni et al. (2009) explain the costs of business groups. Costs 
arise between the controlling and minority shareholders, which lead to misallocation of 
capital. Inefficient compensation schemes and organization problems may also occur in group 
firms. Group firms present consolidated financial statements.  
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The operationalization of all variables along with their sources is presented in Appendix 
2.  
 
4.3. Data analysis 
Our dataset includes both cross-sectional and time series observations that fit panel data. 
It is consistent with prior studies (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Veprauskaite & Adams, 
2013; Tariq & Abbas, 2013; Zakaria, Purhanudin, & Palanimally, 2014). The specification 
test proposed by Hausman is the most accepted procedure to select which test to employ in 
panel data analysis (Baltagi, 2005). It compares fixed effect and random effect regressions. 
The Hausman specification test confirmed the superiority of the random effect model over the 
fixed effect model for both Tobin’s Q (χ2 = 15.34; p > 0.10) and ROA (χ2 = 17.77; p > 0.05).  
In this study, potential endogeneity between firm performance and CG variables is 
tested by Hansen J statistic (Crespi & Renneboog, 2010; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). To employ 
this test, endogenous variables are instrumented by the lagged values of independent 
variables. The Hansen J statistic test examines whether the residuals of the equation correlate 
with the instruments. In case of significant correlation, the model is misspecified as such that 
there is systematic variance in the residuals that can be predicted by the instruments. Thus, 
parameter estimates are biased and cannot be trusted. The results of the Hansen J test fail to 
reject overidentification restrictions attesting that the instrumental variables used throughout 
the models seem to be valid. 
The effects of CG mechanisms on firm performance are shown in the following 
equation: 
PERF = α + β
CONCEN
 + βC − OWN + βF − OWN + βB − SIZE
+ β

B − FML + βB −WMN + βB − EXE + βB − IND
+ β

C − DUAL + β
P − OWN
 + β


CG − IND

 + β
LEV

+ β


AGE
 + β
SIZE
 + β
IND
 + β
GRP
 + µ	 +	v 
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In the equation above, subscript i denotes ith firm (i=1… 210), subscript t denotes tth 
year (t=2010… 2013). Considering Tobin’s Q and ROA variables as financial performance 
measures, two different panel regression models are constructed using Stata 12.  
 
5. Results  
The descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients among the dependent, 
independent and control variables are shown in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
None of the correlations between explanatory variables has correlation coefficients 
above 0.63, and the pairwise correlations do not seem to present serious multicollinearity 
problems for the regression analyses. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for our variables are 
also far below the threshold value of 10 (Freund, Wilson, & Sa, 2006), suggesting that the 
issue of multicollinearity in models is not a concern in this study. The VIF scores are 
indicated in Appendix 3. An additional test, Condition Number Test (k), is used to check 
multicollinearity. The test result (k=3.58) is found to be far less than the threshold value of 
15, indicating that there is no multicollinearity.  
Table 3 presents the random effect regression models predicting the effects of the 
institution specific CG influences on firm performance. Panel data regression is also run in 
accordance with OLS and fixed effects. The results of these regression analyses along with 
random effect are shown in Table 4.  
[Tables 3 and 4] 
5.1. Testing of hypotheses 
As shown in Table 3, two models are estimated for each dependent variable. As the first 
step, all three sets of control variables are entered (Model 1 and Model 3). The effects of the 
hypothesized variables are then tested in Models 2 and 4 where all independent variables 
along with control variables are tested, as shown in Table 3. 
There is full support for Hypothesis 1 in that the coefficient of CONCEN is positive and 
significant (p < 0.05) in both models. That is, the greater the ownership concentration the 
higher the firm performance. Our result is also consistent with previous studies (Thomsen & 
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Pedersen, 2000; Perrini et al., 2008; Singh & Gaur, 2009; Ehikioya, 2009; Nguyen et al., 
2014). To exemplify, drawing on a newly created dataset including 324 listed firms in 
Pakistan, Sing et al. (2018) find that ownership concentration is positively linked with high 
Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Nguyen et al. (2014), based on a sample of 257 Singaporean domiciled 
non-financial listed companies, note that ownership concentration is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q. Again, using archival data on the top 500 Indian and Chinese firms from multiple 
data sources for 2007, Singh and Gaur (2009) conclude that ownership concentration denoted 
by the percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholder has a positive effect on firm 
performance measured by ROA. On the other hand, some researchers come up with 
contradictory results. For instance, relying on a panel data of 468 UK publicly listed firms, 
Veprauskaite and Adams (2013) find that ownership concentration is negatively related to 
firm performance. In a similar vein, El Mehdi (2007), and Bektas and Kaymak (2009) note 
that ownership concentration has a negative effect on firm performance. Even more 
interestingly, a number of researchers such as Tuschke and Sanders (2003) and Sacristán-
Navarro et al. (2011) are unable to find any significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. 
It can be argued that more concentrated ownership means that the firm has closer and 
denser ties to core investors, and hence, better equipped to draw on the range of resources the 
latter has to offer (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Again, it is possible that concentrated ownership 
means that the organization is not pulled in different directions by different groupings of 
shareholders with very different agendas.   
Some partial support is found for Hypothesis 2. The coefficient of C-OWN is negative 
and significant for only ROA (p < 0.01). This means that increases in cross ownership do not 
influence market performance, but diminish accounting performance. It may be that dominant 
investors exert pressure on managers to under-report results in order to deflect demands by 
minority shareholders for higher returns. It is clearly not the case that dominant investors are 
using their position to cross-subsidize other less successful organizations under their ambit 
(Abdullah, 2006). 
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Hypothesis 3 is fully supported, as the coefficient of F-OWN is positive and significant 
for both Tobin’s Q and ROA (p < 0.001). This finding tends to corroborate that of Aydin et al. 
(2007) who reveal that firms with foreign ownership show better performance (ROA) than 
domestic ones based on a dataset of 301 firms listed in BIST for the period of 2003-2004. It 
also aligns with the survey findings of Demirbag, Tatoglu, and Glaister (2007) who, based on 
a sample of Western-Turkish joint ventures in Turkey, note that the increase in the level of 
foreign ownership through foreign direct investment (FDI) provides connections to the 
external environment and helps decrease resource dependence because the interaction of local 
and foreign board members increases the board’s counselling and advisory services that 
improve firm performance.  
The coefficient of B-SIZE is positive for both performance indicators and significant2. 
That is, it is positive and significant for Tobin’s Q (p < 0.001) and ROA (p < 0.01), providing 
full support for Hypothesis 4, confirming the view that with larger boards comes opportunities 
to access a fuller and wider range of family based networks and to build consensus between 
different interest groups. Although this finding aligns with those of previous studies (Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992; Dalton et al., 1999; Veprauskaite & Adams, 2013; Singh et al., 2018), it 
contradicts with some earlier studies as well. For instance, a group of researchers including 
Chiang and Lin (2007), Cheng (2008), Guest (2009) and Nguyen et al. (2014) find that board 
size is negatively associated with firm performance. On the other hand, some researchers such 
as Bektas and Kaymak (2009), and Perrini et al. (2008) could not find any significant 
relationship between the board size and firm performance. 
No support is found for Hypothesis 5, as the coefficient of B-FML is not significant on 
the two performance outcomes. In other words, family board membership does not have any 
impact on firm performance within the context of Turkey. This would suggest that rather than 
being a zero-sum game, the relationship between family owners and other shareholders could 
represent a dynamic and contested relationship, imposing costs and conferring benefits on 
                                                 
2
 We have checked the possibility of having non-linear relationship in the model between board size (by taking 
its logarithm) and firm performance. According to the test results, no significant difference was found between 
the variables indicating non-linearity in the model. 
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both sides. It could also be the case that in family dominated firms, boards are more likely to 
be filled with placemen; it matters less whether board members are family members or not, 
and more whether they are conducive to the implementation of family agendas. It should also 
be noted that this finding is not particularly surprising in that most of the previous studies 
come up with mixed results with respect to the effect of family board membership on firm 
performance. While some studies find a positive relationship between family board 
membership and firm performance (e.g. Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Anderson & Reeb, 
2004), others note an adverse effect of family board membership on firm performance (e.g. 
Ehikioya, 2009).  
Of the board specific control variables, only B-IND is found to have a negative and 
significant effect on Tobin’s Q (p < 0.001). In fact, non-executive independent board 
membership appointment was not compulsory in Turkey prior to 2012. The general tendency 
of firms is to appoint their close friends or the persons in their inner circles who have a 
limited or no effects on decision-making process. Existing work on Turkey suggests that 
independent members on the boards of Turkish companies often lack real autonomy (Usdiken 
& Yildirim-Oktem, 2008; Arıkboga & Mentes, 2009).  
As for CG infrastructure specific controls, both P-OWN and CG-IND have significant 
coefficients for Tobin’s Q. While the sign on P-OWN is negative (p < 0.01), it is positive for 
CG-IND (p < 0.05). The negative coefficient of P-OWN may reflect the extent to which 
public scrutiny makes it much harder for family members to forge deals facilitated by their 
extended networks. It also may mean that family members will be more inclined to engage in 
risky actions, as some of the costs will be borne by outsiders. On the other hand, the positive 
sign on CG-IND confirms that presence in the CG index has a significant relationship on 
performance in terms of Tobin’s Q. 
In terms of firm specific control variables, only LEV and SIZE are found to have 
significant effects (p < 0.001). We note that firms with lower leverage are more likely to 
achieve better performance as indicated by the negative coefficient of LEV. This might be due 
to cash flow effects, whereby the lower leverage firms enable more free cash for new 
investment opportunities. More highly leveraged firms may also have more commitments and 
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covenants, however, which complicate the situation. This finding is somewhat at odds with a 
large body of agency theory, which suggests that debt leverage does not necessarily leave 
firms worse off; rather, it can serve as a positive device in helping prioritize shareholder 
interests. 
SIZE is noted to have a negative and significant effect on Tobin’s Q (p < 0.001), 
whereas it has a positive and significant influence on ROA (p < 0.001). In other words, 
smaller firms indicate better market performance, whereas accounting performance is better in 
larger firms. Larger firms can use economies of scale that reduce production or service costs. 
Larger firms have also negotiation advantages. This can decrease the cost of capital and 
increase firm performance when compared to smaller firms. Again, this would be somewhat 
at odds with the assumption that very large firms often represent the product of untoward 
managerial empire building. However, larger firms face coordination problems, whilst smaller 
firms are able to reach decisions more quickly. Smaller firms are also better equipped to 
circumnavigate the law in settings where institutional coverage is incomplete. 
In terms of our other control variables, women board membership, executive board 
membership, CEO duality, firm age, industry and group affiliation are not significantly 
associated with firm performance.  
A summary of the hypotheses with the independent variables and their predicted and 
actual signs is shown in Table 5. 
[Table 5] 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This study supplements earlier resource-based and agency accounts in bringing an 
institutional perspective to bear in understanding the consequences of specific internal CG 
arrangements within a national setting characterized as family capitalism. We found that 
ownership concentration directly influenced firm performance. This would reflect the extent 
to which families may be adept in devising strategies for filling institutional voids (Liu et al., 
2012). The study reveals that when ownership is concentrated, often in the hands of key 
families, this results in firms performing better. This is because systemic benefits may be 
optimized: A high concentration of ownership incentivizes families to work together in 
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optimizing performance, as there is a smaller proportion of outsiders that will share the costs 
of failure. At the same time, it provides greater incentives for other actors with links to the 
dominant family to facilitate the activities of the firm. Within family capitalism, it is precisely 
such extended family based and associated networks that provide the basis of 
competitiveness; indeed, the system is skewed in favor of such networks (Fainshmidt et al., 
2016).  
In Turkey, cross ownership often is used as a means of ensuring family control even 
when the latter has a minority stake (Demirag & Serter, 2003). We found that the performance 
effects of cross ownership were mixed. This would suggest that any negative effects 
associated with an ability to offload risks onto other, relatively disempowered shareholders, 
might be offset with the benefits this may confer. Effectively, this allows dominant families to 
control a wider number of firms than their capital resources would otherwise suggest. In turn, 
such firms benefit from access to the kind of family based networks that are crucial to 
accessing markets and resources in such institutional environments. At the same time, the 
disjuncture between market and (sub-optimal) accounting performance in such firms might 
suggest that controlling families may under-report result interlocking ownership would reduce 
pressures by outside shareholders, resulting in an accounting performance being a lesser 
priority than would otherwise be the case (Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009). 
At the same time, we encountered beneficial effects flowing from FDI. Whilst a 
scrutiny of earlier relevant research might make such a finding relatively predictable 
(Fainshmidt et al., 2016), our study highlights the extent to which family ownership may 
perform even better when they have access to knowledge and insights from outsiders, and 
access to their networks. Hence, we found that when firms attracted overseas investment, 
similarly performed better. Not only might overseas investors provide knowledge on 
emerging global best practices, but also their access to international networks that might 
supplement domestic family based ones.  
Again, we found that when firms had larger boards, they performed better. Larger 
boards may allow more leeway for professional managers to exercise their judgement, helping 
create more space for fresh insights. They would also mean that there is more place to 
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accommodate different interest groupings within the dominant family, draw in extended kin, 
and allow access to a greater pool of knowledge and, potentially access to a wider range of 
personal and familial networks. Under family capitalism, it is precisely access to such 
networks that forms the foundation of competiveness, providing a mechanism for coping with 
failures in formal institutions, providing a greater predictability in exchange relations, and, 
potentially, solutions for overcoming or circumnavigating unwelcome regulation. They may 
also influence the allocation of capital, mitigating excessive risks from over-allocation in a 
specific area, and, hence, offsetting some of the limitations of family ownership in this regard 
(Tabalujan, 2002) 
Although it could be argued that family ownership brings with it specific problems in its 
own right – most notably in terms of the allocation of capital – it could also be argued that 
they represent a specific mode of ownership that is particularly suited to specific categories of 
emerging market (Uddin, 2005). Above all, a core theoretical finding is the importance of 
context, and the extent to which universalistic explanations of CG need to be qualified and 
altered to take account of very different institutional and social realities. Internal CG is likely 
to be amended to take advantages of the opportunities and compensate for the challenges 
imposed by specific national institutional realities, and associated informal social 
conventions. Our findings highlight most optimal internal CG configurations to maximize 
systemic benefits and compensate for weaknesses. Clearly, there is no single optimal internal 
CG ‘recipe’; rather, in specific contexts, dominant forms evolve that are best equipped to cope 
with, and gain the optimal benefits from a particular setting. This would highlight the 
relevance of socio-economic approaches to comparative institutional analysis (Amable, 2003; 
Sinani, Stafsudd, Thomsen, Edling, & Randøy, 2008), but also the relevance of detailed 
analysis of internal CG mechanisms in extending our understanding of national institutional 
effects. Although specifically focusing on Turkey, the findings would be of relevance to other 
national contexts with uneven and relatively fluid institutions and where family firms play a 
particularly prominent role: This would include other Mediterranean market economies 
(Amable, 2003), potentially a wider range of emerging markets further afield, and, indeed, as 
a basis for future comparative analysis.  
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6.1 Managerial implications 
The empirical results show statistically significant and positive associations between 
ownership concentration, foreign ownership, board size and firm performance and, to a lesser 
extent negative association between cross ownership and firm performance. In Turkey, 
ownership concentration is high because firms are generally reluctant to enter into an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) process. Organizations that are willing to go public are required to 
publish a significant amount of financial and operational information. For this reason, 
organizations feel that they lose competitive advantages in the market; this could also reflect 
the concern that this may place the pursuit of family interests under undue public scrutiny. 
Publicly traded firms also have to obey additional regulations especially in sectors such as 
banking, insurance, telecommunications, and energy. Although this may distort firm level 
decision-making, the findings suggest that firms are quite good at improvising solutions and, 
hence, that regulatory reform may disrupt existing ‘fixes’ without bringing with them better 
alternative ones. Family businesses in Turkey have incentive to monitor subsidiaries via a 
cross-shareholding structure; this may have some adverse consequences, but the picture we 
found was equivocal in the latter regard. Although we found that the proportion of family 
members on boards had no effect, this would reflect the extent to which non-family board 
members may be carefully selected not only because of their potential influence and expertise, 
but also because of their relative conduciveness to family interests.  
 
6.2 Limitations and future research 
While this study sheds light on the extant literature regarding the connection between 
CG and firm performance, it is subject to some limitations. Some of the important variables 
typically deployed in studies of this nature, such as CEO and board tenure, CEO and board 
compensation, managerial or director ownership and board process (number of board 
meetings and number of decisions taken), were not included in the study due to the 
unavailability of panel data for these variables.  
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When the study was undertaken, the number of firms quoted in BIST was 428, whereas 
this research relied on a sample of 210 firms composed of mainly large scale and long-
established firms. A new dataset involving SMEs and relatively younger firms may also be a 
valuable contribution to CG performance research in emerging countries such as Turkey. 
Finally, in exploring the relationship between national institutions, internal governance and 
performance, the study provides a foundation of understanding in specific contextual 
dynamics; a comparative dimension would yield fuller insights on firm level outcomes in 
contexts where families are a dominant ownership form.  
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their extremely helpful and insightful comments, which enabled us to greatly improve on 
earlier iterations of this paper.  
  
27 
 
References 
 
Abdullah, S. N. (2004). Board composition, CEO duality and performance among Malaysian 
listed companies. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 4(4), 47–61.  
Abdullah, S. N. (2006). Directors' remuneration, firm's performance and corporate 
governance in Malaysia among distressed companies. Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, 6(2), 162–174.  
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber C. R. (2012). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 31(3), 377–397.  
Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009). Codes of good governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 376–387. 
Alpay, G., Bodur, M., Ener, H. and Talug, C. (2005). Comparing board-level governance at 
MNEs and local firms: Lessons from Turkey. Journal of International 
Management, 11(1), 67–86. 
Amable, B. (2003). The diversity of modern capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in 
S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 209–237. 
Ararat, M., & Ugur, M. (2006). Turkey: Corporate governance at the crossroads. In C.A. 
Mallin (Eds.), Handbook on international corporate governance country analyses, 193–
209, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Ararat, M., Orbay, H., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2010). The effects of board independence in 
controlled firms: Evidence from Turkey. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663403 
Arıkboga, S., & Mentes, A. (2009). Türkiye'de kurumsal yönetişim iklimi (Corporate 
governance climate in Turkey), İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 59(2), 85–120. 
Atakan, S., & Ozsoy, Z., & Oba, B. (2008). Implementation of good corporate governance in 
Turkey: The case of Dogan Yayin Holding. Human Systems Management, 27, 201–216. 
Aydin, N., Sayim, M., & Yalama, A. (2007). Foreign ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from Turkey. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 11, 
127–150.  
Banks, E. (2004). Corporate governance financial responsibility, controls and ethics. 
Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric analysis of panel data. Third edition. West Sussex: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Bauwhede, H. V. (2009). On the relation between corporate governance compliance and 
operating performance. Accounting and Business Research, 39(5), 497–513.  
Bebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and 
dual class equity: The mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-
flow rights. In Concentrated corporate ownership (295–318). University of Chicago 
Press.  Available at: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9013.pdf 
Bektas, E., & Kaymak, T. (2009). Governance mechanisms and ownership in an emerging 
market: The case of Turkish banks. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 45(6), 20–
32.  
Berghe, L. V. D. (2002). Corporate governance in a globalising world: Convergence or 
divergence? A European perspective. New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London, Moscow: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-
term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231–273.  
28 
 
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 14, 257–273.  
Bozec, R., (2007). US market integration and corporate governance practices: Evidence from 
Canadian companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 535–545. 
Bozec, Y., Bozec, R., & Dia, M. (2010). Overall governance, firm value and deviation from 
one share: One vote principle. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 6(4), 305–
328. 
Black, B. S., Kim, W., & Jang, H. (2006). Does corporate governance affect firm value? 
Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 22(2), 366–413. 
Brewster, C., Wood, G., & Brookes, M.  (2008). Similarity, isomorphism or duality? Recent 
survey evidence on the HRM policies of MNCs. British Journal of Management, 19(4), 
320–342. 
Bugra, A., & Savaşkan, O. (2014). New capitalism in Turkey: The relationship between 
politics, religion and business. Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Campbell, K., & Minguez-Vera, A. (2008). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
financial performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 435–451.  
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled 
firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 249–265. 
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., & Yang, X. (2009). Varieties of Asian capitalism: Toward an 
institutional theory of Asian enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3), 
361–380. 
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87, 157–176.  
Chiang, H. T., & He, L. J. (2010). Board supervision capability and information transparency. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(1), 18–31.  
Chiang, M.-H., & Lin, J.-H. (2007). The relationship between corporate governance and firm 
productivity: Evidence from Taiwan’s manufacturing firms. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(5), 768–779.  
Church, R. (1993). The family firm in industrial capitalism: International perspectives on 
hypotheses and history. Business History, 35(4), 17–43. 
Collings, D., Demirbag, M., Mellahi, K., Tatoglu, E., & Wood, G. (2014). High-performance 
work systems and organizational performance in emerging economies: Evidence from 
MNEs in Turkey. Management International Review, 54(3), 325–359. 
Crespi, R., & Renneboog, L. (2010). Is (Institutional) shareholder activism new? Evidence 
from UK shareholder coalitions in the Pre-Cadbury era. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 18(4), 274–295. 
Dalton, R. D., Daily, C. H., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of directors and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674–
686. 
Demirag, I., & Serter, M. (2003). Ownership patterns and control in Turkish listed companies. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(1), 40–51. 
Demirbag, M., Tatoglu, E., & Glaister, K. W. (2007). Factors influencing perceptions of 
performance: The case of western FDI in an emerging market. International Business 
Review, 16(3), 310–336. 
Demirbag, M., Fracknall-Hughes, Glaister, K. W., & Tatoglu, E. (2013). Ethics and taxation: 
A cross-national comparison of UK and Turkish firms. International Business Review, 
22(1), 100–111. 
29 
 
Demirbag, M., Wood, G. T, Makhmadshoev, D., & Rymkevich, O. (2017). Varieties of CSR: 
Institutions and socially responsible behaviour. International Business Review, 26(6), 
1064–1074. 
Denis, D. K., & McConnell J. J. (2005). International corporate governance. In K. Keasey, S. 
Thompson, M. Wright (Eds.) Corporate governance accountability, enterprise and 
international comparisons, 251–284, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West 
Sussex: John Wiley and Sons. 
Dietzenbacher, E., & Temurshoev, U. (2008). Ownership relations in the presence of cross-
shareholding. Journal of Economics, 95(3), 189–212. 
DiMaggio, P. J. & Powell, W. W. (1991). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Donaldson, L. (1990). The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and management theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 369–381.  
Dore, R. (2008). Best practice winning out. Socio-Economic Review, 6(4), 779–784. 
Dumludag, D. (2009). An analysis of the determinants of foreign direct investment in Turkey: 
The role of the institutional context. Journal of Business Economics and 
Management, 10(1), 15–30. 
Earle, J. S., Kucsera, C., & Telegdy, Á. (2005). Ownership concentration and corporate 
performance on the Budapest stock exchange: Do too many cooks spoil the goulash? 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 254–263. 
Ehikioya, B. I. (2009). Corporate governance structure and firm performance in developing 
economies: Evidence from Nigeria. Corporate Governance: The International Journal 
of Business in Society, 9(3), 231–243.  
Ellwood, S., & Garcia-Lacalle, J. (2014). The influence of presence and position of women on 
the boards of directors: The case of NHS foundation trusts. Journal of Business Ethics, 
130, 69–84.  
El Mehdi, K. I. (2007). Empirical evidence on corporate governance and corporate 
performance in Tunisia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1429–
1441.  
Essen, M., Strike, V. M., Carney, M., & Sapp, S. (2015). The resilient family firm: 
Stakeholder outcomes and institutional effects. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 23(3), 167–183. 
Faccioa, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European 
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3), 365–395. 
Fainshmidt, S., Judge, W. Q., Aguilera, R. V., & Smith, A. (2016). Varieties of institutional 
systems: A contextual taxonomy of understudied countries. Journal of World Business, 
53(3), 307–322. 
Finegold, D., Benson, G. S., & Hecht, D. (2007). Corporate boards and company 
performance: Review of research in light of recent reforms. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(5), 865–878. 
Freund, R. J. Wilson, W. J., & Sa, P. (2006). Regression analysis: Statistical modeling of 
response variable. Second Edition. London: Elsevier Inc.  
Goergen, M., Manjon, M. C., & Renneboog, L. (2005). Corporate governance in Germany. In 
K. Keasey, S. Thompson, & M. Wright (Eds.) Corporate governance: Accountability, 
enterprise and international comparisons, 285–326. The Atrium, Southern Gate, 
Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons.  
Górriz, C. C., & Fumás V. (1996). Ownership structure and firm performance: Some 
empirical evidence from Spain. Managerial and Decision Economics, 17, 575–586. 
30 
 
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R., (1996). Understanding radical organizational change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management 
Review, 21(4), 1022–1054. 
Guest, P. M. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance: Evidence from the UK. 
European Journal of Finance, 15(4), 385–404.  
Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (2001). An introduction to the varieties of capitalism. In P. Hall, & D. 
Soskice (eds.), Varieties of capitalism: The institutional basis of competitive advantage, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hancke, B., Rhodes, M., & Thatcher, M.  (2007). Introduction. In B. Hancke, M. Rhodes, & 
M. Thatcher (eds.), Beyond varieties of capitalism: Conflict, contradiction, and 
complementarities in the European economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heenetigala, K. (2011). Corporate governance practices and firm performance of listed 
companies in Sri Lanka. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Melbourne: Victoria 
University. 
Heugens, P. P., Van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. H. (2009). Meta-analyzing ownership 
concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained 
understanding. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3), 481–512. 
Hilb, M. (2006). New corporate governance successful board tools. Second Edition. Berlin: 
Springer Science and Business Media. 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 
383–396. 
Hitt, M. A., Ireland, D. R., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2004). Strategic management: 
Competitiveness and globalization. Sixth Edition. Florida: Cengage Learning. 
Hoon, J., & Prather, L. J. (2001). Tobin’s q, agency conflicts, and differential wealth effects 
of international joint ventures. Global Finance Journal, 12, 267–283.  
Hoskisson, R. E., Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., & Peng, M. (2013). Emerging multinationals 
from mid-range economies: The influence of institutions and factor markets. Journal of 
Management Studies, 50(7), 1295–1321. 
Isidro, H., & Sobral, M. (2015). The effects of women on corporate boards on firm value, 
financial performance, and ethical and social compliance. Journal of Business Ethics, 
132(1), 1–19.  
Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from India’s 
top companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(4), 492–509.  
Jaggi, B., Leung, S., & Gul, F. (2009). Family control, board independence and earnings 
management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 28(4), 281–300. 
Jensen, C. M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76, 323–329. 
Jensen, C. M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
Johannisson, B., & Huse, M. (2000). Recruiting outside board members in the small family 
business: An ideological challenge. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12(4), 
353–378. 
Karadag, R. (2010). Neoliberal restructuring in Turkey: From state to oligarchic 
capitalism (No. 10/7). MPIfG Discussion Paper. 
Kaymak, T., & Bektas, E. (2008). East meets west? Board characteristics in an emerging 
market: evidence from Turkish banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
16(6), 550–561.  
31 
 
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection, and 
performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10, 703–728. 
Krishnan, H. A., & Park, D. (2005). A few good women - on top management teams. Journal 
of Business Research, 58, 1712–1720.  
Kula, V. (2005). The impact of the roles, structure and process of boards on firm 
performance: Evidence from Turkey. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13(2), 265–276. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe N. (2006). The link between corporate governance and 
performance of the non-traditional export sector: Evidence from Ghana. Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 6(5), 609–623. 
Lam, T., & Lee, S. (2012). Family ownership, board committees and firm performance: 
Evidence from Hong Kong. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society, 12(3), 353–366. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants 
of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 1131–1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the 
world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517. 
Leaptrott, J., (2005). An institutional theory view of the family business. Family Business 
Review, 18(3), 215–228. 
Liu, W., Yang, H., & Zhang, G. (2012). Does family business excel in firm performance? An 
institution-based view. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(4), 965–987. 
Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western 
European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12, 321–341. 
Mobbs, S. (2015). Is an outside chair always better? The role of non-CEO inside chairs on 
corporate boards. The Financial Review, 50, 547–574.  
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large family business 
groups. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 367–382. 
Mura, R. (2007). Firm performance: Do non-executive directors have a mind of their own? 
Evidence from UK panel data. Financial Management, 36(3), 81–112.  
Muth, M. M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship theory and board structure: A 
contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6(1), 5–28.  
Nguyen, T., Locke, S., & Reddy, K. (2014). A dynamic estimation of governance structures 
and financial performance for Singaporean companies. Economic Modelling, 40, 1–11.  
Nicholson, G. J., & Kiel, G. C. (2007). Can directors impact performance? A case-based test 
of three theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(4), 585–608.  
Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. (2010). Women directors' contribution to board decision-making and 
strategic involvement: The role of equality perception. European Management Review, 
7(1), 16–29. 
Nilsson Okutan, G. (2007). Corporate governance in Turkey. European Business 
Organization Law Review, 8(2), 195–236. 
O’Connor, T., Kinsella, S., & O’Sullivan, V. (2014). Legal protection of investors, corporate 
governance, and investable premia in emerging markets. International Review of 
Economics and Finance, 29, 426–439.  
Peng, M. W., & Jiang, Y. (2010). Institutions behind family ownership and control in large 
firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2), 253–273. 
Perrini, F., Rossi, G., & Rovetta, B. (2008). Does ownership structure affect performance? 
Evidence from the Italian market. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
16(4), 312–325.  
32 
 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1998). Which capitalism? Lessons form the East Asian crisis. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 11(3), 40–48. 
Renders, A., Gaeremynck, A., & Sercu, P. (2010). Corporate governance ratings and company 
performance: A Cross-European study. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 18(2), 87–106.  
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish 
evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 404–413.  
Sacristán-Navarro, M., Gómez-Ansón, S., & Cabeza-García, L. (2011). Large shareholders’ 
combinations in family firms: Prevalence and performance effects. Journal of Family 
Business Strategy, 2, 101–112.  
Sarkar, J., & Sarkar, S. (2000). Large shareholder activism in corporate governance in 
developing countries: Evidence from India. International Review of Finance, 1(3), 161–
194.  
Schnake, M., Williams, R. J., & Fredenberger, W. (2006). Women on boards of directors: 
Effects on firm social performance in the basic materials and financial services sectors. 
Journal of Applied Business Research, 22(1), 31–40.  
Setia-Atmaja, L. Y. (2009). Governance mechanisms and firm value: The impact of 
ownership concentration and dividends. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17(6), 694–709.  
Sinani, E., Stafsudd, A., Thomsen, S., Edling, C., & Randøy, C. (2008). Corporate 
governance in Scandinavia: comparing networks and formal institutions. European 
Management Review, 5(1), 27–40. 
Singh, D. A., & Gaur, A. S. (2009). Business group affiliation, firm governance, and firm 
performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17(4), 411–425.  
Singh, S., Tabassum, N., Darwish, T. K., & Batsakis, G. (2018). Corporate governance and 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of organizational performance. British Journal of Management, 
29, 171–190. 
Solomon, J., & Solomon, A. (2004). Corporate governance and accountability. The Atrium, 
Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons. 
Su, Y., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. (2008). Principal-principal conflict in the governance of the 
Chinese public corporation. Management and Organization Review, 4(1), 17–38. 
Tabalujan, B. S. (2002). Family capitalism and corporate governance of family-controlled 
listed companies in Indonesia. UNSWLJ, 25, 486–514. 
Tariq, Y. B., & Abbas, Z. (2013). Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: 
Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance. Economic 
Modelling, 35, 565–575.  
Thomsen, S., & Pedersen, T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the 
largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 689–705.  
Topak, M. S. (2011). The effect of board size on firm performance: Evidence from 
Turkey. Middle Eastern Finance and Economics, 14, 119–127. 
Tuschke, A., & Sanders, G. (2003). Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance 
reform: The case of Germany. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 631–649.  
Uddin, S. (2005). Privatization in Bangladesh: The emergence of ‘family capitalism’. 
Development and Change, 36(1), 157–182. 
Usdiken, B., & Yildirim-Oktem, O. (2008). Changes in the institutional environment and 
"nonexecutive" and "independent" directors on the boards of firms affiliated to large 
family business groups, Amme İdaresi Dergisi, 41(1), 43–71. 
33 
 
Usdiken, B., & Yildirim-Oktem, O., & Senol, F. N. (2015). İç halkaya dâhil olmak: Türkiye’ 
deki büyük aile holdinglerinde profesyonel yöneticiler. ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, 42, 
521–551. 
Van Essen, M., Strike, V. M., Carney, M., & Sapp, S. (2015). The resilient family firm: 
Stakeholder outcomes and institutional effects. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 23, 167–183. 
Veprauskaite, E., & Adams, M. (2013). Do powerful chief executives influence the financial 
performance of UK firms? The British Accounting Review, 45, 229–241. 
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect 
firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–417. 
 Witt, M. A., & Redding, G. (2013). Asian business systems: Institutional comparison, 
clusters and implications for varieties of capitalism and business systems theory. Socio-
Economic Review, 11(2), 265–300. 
Wood, G., Dibben, P., & Ogden, S. (2014). Comparative capitalism without capitalism, and 
production without workers: The limits and possibilities of contemporary institutional 
analysis. International Journal of Management Reviews, 16(4), 384–396. 
Wood, G., & Frynas, G. (2006). The institutional basis of economic failure: Anatomy of the 
segmented business system. Socio-Economic Review, 4(2), 239–277. 
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: 
A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291–334.  
Zakaria, Z., Purhanudin, N., & Palanimally, Y. R. (2014). Board governance and firm 
performance: A panel data analysis. Journal of Business Law and Ethics, 2(1), 1–12.  
Zattoni, A., Pedersen, T., & Kumar, V. (2009). The performance of group-affiliated firms 
during institutional transition: A longitudinal study of Indian firms. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 17(4), 510–523.  
 
 
34 
 
Figure 1. Research framework 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the sample 
Sample characteristics No (%) 
Firm age (years) 
  Young firms (less than 10) 8 3.8 
Middle age firms (10-19) 34 16.2 
Mature firms (equal to or more than 20) 168 80.0 
Sector of operation 
  
Holding and investment companies 24 11.4 
Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 24 11.4 
Non-metallic mineral products 22 10.5 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 22 10.5 
Food, beverage and tobacco 19 9.0 
Chemicals, petroleum rubber and plastic products 18 8.6 
Basic metal industries 14 6.7 
Textile, wearing apparel and leather 12 5.7 
Technology 11 5.2 
Paper and paper products, printing and publishing 11 5.2 
Transportation, telecommunication and storage 9 4.3 
Other services 24 11.4 
Geographic location 
  
Marmara 144 68.6 
Aegean 29 13.8 
Inner Anatolia 16 7.6 
Mediterranean  12 5.7 
Black Sea 5 2.4 
Other 4 1.9 
Total 210 100 
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 Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 TOBIN'S Q 0.94 1.09 1 
                 
2 ROA 0.04 0.11 0.25* 1 
                3 CONCEN 0.65 0.19 0.19*  0.12* 1 
               
4 C-OWN 0.54 0.29 0.14*  0.09* 0.67* 1 
              5 F-OWN 0.19 0.25 0.18*  0.10* 0.23* 0.30* 1 
      
       
6 B-SIZE 7.10 2.10 -0.01  0.14* 0.11* 0.18* 0.15* 1 
     
       
7 B-FML 0.19 0.24 -0.15*   0.02  -0.17* -0.28* -0.24* -0.07 1  
   
       
8 B-WMN 0.13 0.15 -0.11* 0.02  -0.04 -0.15* -0.17* -0.09* 0.21* 1 
   
       
9 B-EXE 0.22 0.21 -0.11*  -0.11* 0.13* -0.21* -0.08* -0.23* 0.07 0.31* 1   
      
 
10 B-IND 0.18 0.16 -0.06  -0.08  -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11* 1 
        
11 C-DUL 0.19 0.39  0.05  -0.01  -0.19* -0.29* 0.00 -0.22* 0.12** 0.18* 0.36* 0.00 1 
       
12 P-OWN 0.47 0.25 -0.15*  -0.13*  -0.63* -0.40* -0.05 -0.14* 0.06 0.02 0.15* 0.07 0.24* 1 
      
13 CG-IND 0.13 0.33 -0.05 0.07  -0.01 0.11* 0.12* 0.26* -0.09* -0.03 -0.09 0.09 -0.16* -0.08* 1 
     
14 LEV 0.50 0.33 -0.11* -0.56*  -0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.10* 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.01 1 
    
15 AGE 3.37 0.67 -0.04  0.11*    0.03 0.05 0.08* 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.09 1 
   
16 SIZE 20.05 1.77 -0.22*  0.13*  0.13* 0.18* 0.25* 0.48* 0.06 -0.08 -0.17* 0.05 -0.23* -0.18* 0.33* 0.09 0.15* 1 
  
17 IND 0.36 0.48 -0.08 -0.14* -0.14* -0.20* -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.09* 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.18* -0.26* 0.18* 1 
 
18 GRP 0.63 0.48 -0.21* -0.10*   -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.13* 0.07 -0.10* 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.13* 0.17* 0.14* 0.39* 0.14* 1 
Notes: 
TOBIN’S Q: Tobin’s Q, ROA: Return on assets, CONCEN: Ownership concentration, C-OWN: Cross ownership, F-OWN: Foreign ownership, B-SIZE: Board size, B-FML: Family board membership, B-WMN: Women board 
membership, B-EXE: Executive board membership, B-IND: Independent board membership C-DUL: CEO duality, P-OWN: Publicly held ownership, CG-IND: CG, LEV: Leverage, AGE: Firm age, SIZE: Firm size, IND: 
Industry, GRP: Group affiliation.  
*p < 0.01, N = 840. 
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Table 3. The results of panel data analyses 
  
  
TOBIN'S Q ROA 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Variable Definition β S.E β S.E β S.E β S.E 
Independent variables 
        CONCEN Ownership concentration   0.44* 0.34   0.05* 0.03 
C-OWN Cross ownership   0.02 0.20   -0.04** 0.02 
F-OWN Foreign ownership   0.59*** 0.19   0.05*** 0.02 
B-SIZE Board size   0.07*** 0.02   0.00** 0.00 
B-FML Family board membership   -0.15 0.17   0.01 0.02 
Board specific controls         
B-WMN Women board membership -0.30 0.25 -0.15 0.25 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 
B-EXE Executive board membership -0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
B-IND Independent board membership -0.19* 0.13 -0.37*** 0.13 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
C-DUL CEO duality -0.11 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
CG infrastructure specific controls         
P-OWN Publicly held ownership -0.79*** 0.22 -0.52** 0.25 -0.03* 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
CG-IND CG index 0.18* 0.13 0.19* 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Firms specific controls          
LEV Leverage -0.67*** 0.15 -0.67*** 0.15 -0.21*** 0.02 -0.22*** 0.02 
AGE Firm age -0.02 0.10 -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SIZE Firm size -0.31*** 0.04 -0.36*** 0.04 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
IND Industry 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
GRP Group affiliation 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  Constant 7.8*** 0.78 7.90*** 0.78 -0.10* 0.06 -0.10* 0.06 
  Observations 746 745 750 749 
  Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.14 0.26 0.29 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 4. Regression results in terms of different models 
Variables 
Ordinary 
Least Square 
Fixed  
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Ordinary 
Least Square 
Fixed  
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q ROA ROA ROA 
CONCEN 0.679** 0.690** 0.445* 0.0556** -0.00938 0.0492* 
 
(0.303) (0.426) (0.342) (0.0262) (0.0624) (0.0343) 
C-OWN -0.160 -0.0121 0.0221 -0.0432*** -0.0301 -0.0416** 
 
(0.176) (0.246) (0.200) (0.0153) (0.0364) (0.0201) 
F-OWN 0.823*** 0.0923 0.586*** 0.0422*** 0.0220 0.0471*** 
 
(0.158) (0.249) (0.193) (0.0137) (0.0365) (0.0185) 
B-SIZE 0.0443** 0.0755*** 0.0738*** 0.00357** 0.00483* 0.00381** 
 
(0.0192) (0.0215) (0.0191) (0.00163) (0.00316) (0.00203) 
B-FML -0.138 -0.135 -0.150 0.00405 0.0236 0.00953 
 (0.157) (0.207) (0.174) (0.0136) (0.0306) (0.0177) 
B-WMN -0.635*** 0.116 -0.149 -0.00415 0.0398 0.00252 
 (0.260) (0.281) (0.253) (0.0226) (0.0413) (0.0278) 
B-EXE -0.454*** 0.282 -0.0154 -0.0243* 0.0343 -0.00655 
 (0.192) (0.227) (0.198) (0.0167) (0.0335) (0.0211) 
B-IND -0.146 0.000649 -0.368*** -0.0310* -0.00539 -0.0195 
 
(0.225) (0.155) (0.134) (0.0195) (0.0225) (0.0173) 
C_DUAL 0.239** -0.0222 0.0149 0.0101 0.0101 0.00296 
 
(0.103) (0.171) (0.128) (0.00892) (0.0253) (0.0121) 
P-OWN -0.479*** 0.0872 -0.524** -0.0188 0.0101 -0.0213 
 (0.184) (0.394) (0.253) (0.0160) (0.0578) (0.0224) 
CG-IND 0.0606 0.110 0.188* 0.00549 -0.0201 8.86e-05 
 
(0.108) (0.159) (0.129) (0.00936) (0.0235) (0.0126) 
LEV -0.827*** -0.554*** -0.670*** -0.181*** -0.301*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.145) (0.170) (0.146) (0.0125) (0.0250) (0.0157) 
AGE -0.0379 -0.638*** -0.0509 0.00591 0.0117 0.00770 
 
(0.0626) (0.263) (0.101) (0.00541) (0.0386) (0.00783) 
SIZE -0.179*** -0.647*** -0.358*** 0.00995*** 0.00872** 0.00997*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0576) (0.0388) (0.00234) (0.00461) (0.00290) 
IND 0.0530 - 0.120 -0.0139** - -0.0113 
 
(0.0824) - (0.148) (0.00711) - (0.0107) 
GRP -0.123* - 0.101 -0.0155** - -0.0107 
 
(0.0842) - (0.148) (0.00726) - (0.0108) 
Constant 4.697*** 15.28*** 7.900*** -0.107** -0.0653 -0.103* 
 
(0.587) (1.358) (0.785) (0.0480) (0.161) (0.0624) 
Observations 745 745 745 749 749 749 
R-squared 0.212 0.063 0.155 0.299 0.219 0.293 
Number of groups  - 197 197 -  197 197 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis  Variable Name 
Expected  
Sign 
Actual Sign 
(TOBIN'S Q) 
Actual Sign  
(ROA) Level of Support 
Independent variables 
H1 There is a positive association between ownership concentration and firm performance. CONCEN (+)         (+)*           (+)* Supported 
H2 There is a negative association between the share of cross ownership and firm performance. C-OWN (-)         (+) (-)** Partially supported 
H3 There is a positive association between the share of foreign ownership and firm performance. F-OWN (+) (+)***    (+)*** Supported 
H4 There is a positive association between board size and firm performance.  B-SIZE (+) (+)***  (+)** Supported 
H5 There is a positive association between the proportion of family board members and firm performance. B-FML (+)          (-)           (+) Not supported 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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 Appendix 1. BIST market definitions pre-november 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Market  Definition Number of Firms 
NATIONAL MARKET It is the market where the stocks of companies that satisfy BIST listing requirements are traded. 234 
SECOND NATIONAL 
MARKET 
It is the market where stocks of the companies that fail to satisfy the 
applicable listing and trading requirements for National Market, 
stocks of small and medium sized enterprises and companies, which 
are temporarily or permanently delisted from National Market, are 
traded. 
78 
WATCH LIST 
COMPANIES MARKET 
In the case that companies are subject to monitoring and examination 
as a result of the occurrence of certain conditions, the stocks of such 
companies can be traded on the BIST Watch list Companies Market 
under continuous surveillance, supervision and monitoring, along with 
measures to inform investors in a continuous and timely manner. 
22 
COLLECTIVE 
PRODUCTS MARKET 
It is the market where the stocks of investment trusts, real estate 
investment trusts, venture capital investment trusts and the 
participation certificates of ETFs are traded. 
66 
EMERGING 
COMPANIES MARKET 
It is the market established to create a transparent and organized 
platform where securities, issued in order to raise funds from the 
capital markets by companies, which could not satisfy the BIST 
listing requirements but with growth and development potential, can 
be traded. 
11 
FREE TRADING 
PLATFORM It includes the stocks of companies trading in Free Trading Platform.  17 
OFF EXCHANGE It includes the stocks of companies that are delisted or suspended from trading by the BIST Executive Council. - 
TOTAL 428 
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 Appendix 2. Operationalization of variables 
Variable Measurement Source Related measurement previously used 
Tobin's Q 
 
 
 
The percentage of market 
value of a firm to total assets. 
 
 
 
Central Registry Agency 
(www.mkk.com.tr) and 
auditing financial statements. 
 
 
Nguyen et al. (2014); Veprauskaite and Adams 
(2013); Heenetigala (2011); Renders et al. (2010); 
Bozec et al. (2010); Guest (2009); Ehikioya (2009); 
Jackling and Johl (2009); Setia-Atmaja (2009); 
Perrini et al. (2008); El Mehdi (2007) 
2. Return on assets 
 
 
 
 
The percentage of net 
income to total assets. 
 
 
 
Auditing financial statements 
 
 
 
 
Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2014); Veprauskaite 
and Adams (2013); Bektas and Kaymak (2009); 
Ehikioya (2009); Jackling and Johl (2009); 
Bauwhede (2009); Aydin et al. (2007); Krishnan 
and Park (2005); Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
3. Ownership concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders who own at 
least 5 percent of the firm’s 
ordinary shares.  
 
 
 
Central Registry Agency 
(www.mkk.com.tr) 
 
 
 
 
Nguyen et al. (2014); Veprauskaite and Adams 
(2013); Sacristán-Navarro et al. (2011); Bektas and 
Kaymak (2009); Ehikioya (2009); Setia-Atmaja 
(2009); Perrini et al. (2008); El Mehdi (2007); 
Tuschke and Sanders (2003);  
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
4. Cross ownership 
 
 
 
The percentage of firms 
share (rather than individual 
share) to total shares. 
 
Central Registry Agency 
(www.mkk.com.tr) 
 
 
Faccio and Lang (2002); Dietzenbacher and 
Temurshoev (2008) 
 
 
5. Foreign ownership 
 
The percentage of foreign 
investors share to total shares 
Central Registry Agency 
(www.mkk.com.tr) 
Aydin et al. (2007) 
 
6. Board size 
 
 
 
 
 
The total number of 
members on the board of 
directors. 
 
 
 
Firms' annual reports and 
corporate web pages 
 
 
 
 
Mobbs (2015); Nguyen et al. (2014); Zakaria et al. 
(2014); Veprauskaite and Adams (2013); Guest 
(2009); Jackling and Johl (2009); Kaymak and 
Bektas (2008); Cheng (2008); Perrini et al. (2008); 
El Mehdi (2007); Chiang and Lin (2007); 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) 
7.Family board membership 
 
 
The number of family 
members divided by the total 
number of board of directors. 
Firms' annual reports and 
corporate web pages 
 
Ehikioya (2009); Anderson and Reeb (2004) 
 
 
8. Women board 
membership 
 
The number of female 
directors divided by the total 
number of board of directors. 
Firms' annual reports and 
corporate web pages 
 
Isidro and Sobral (2015); Ellwood and Garcia-
Lacalle (2014); Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008); Schnake et al. (2006) 
9. Executive board 
membership 
 
The number of executive 
directors divided by the total 
number of board of directors 
Firms' annual reports and 
corporate web pages 
 
Mobbs, (2015); Kaymak and Bektas (2008) 
 
 
10. Independent board 
membership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of independent 
directors divided by the total 
number of board of directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms' annual reports and 
corporate web pages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nguyen et al. (2014); Zakaria et al. (2014); 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2012); Heenetigala (2011); 
Chiang and He (2010); Bektas and Kaymak (2009); 
Jackling and Johl (2009); Singh and Gaur (2009); 
Setia-Atmaja (2009); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); 
Mura (2007); El Mehdi (2007); Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Anderson and Reeb 
(2004); Abdullah (2004); Bhagat and Black (2002) 
11. CEO duality 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairman of the board and 
CEO are the same individual. 
Equals 1 if CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board, 
otherwise 0. 
 
Firms' annual reports and 
corporate web pages 
 
 
 
 
Nguyen et al. (2014); Veprauskaite and Adams 
(2013); Heenetigala (2011); Bektas and Kaymak 
(2009); Ehikioya (2009); Jackling and Johl (2009); 
Kaymak and Bektas (2008); Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008); Chiang and Lin (2007); Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Abdullah (2004) 
12. Publicly held ownership 
 
The percentage of publicly 
traded share to total shares. 
Central Registry Agency 
(www.mkk.com.tr) 
 - 
 
13. Corporate governance 
index 
 
 
 
Whether a firm is quoted in 
Corporate Governance index 
(BIST) or not. Equals 1 if 
firms’ quoted in CG index, 
otherwise 0. 
Public Disclosure Platform 
(www.kap.gov.tr) 
 
 
 
Renders et al. (2010); Bauwhede (2009); Bozec et 
al. (2010); Black et al. (2006); Tuschke and 
Sanders (2003) 
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 Appendix 2. (Continued) 
Variable Measurement Source Related measurement previously used 
14. Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
The sum of short-term and 
long-term debt divided by 
total assets. 
 
 
 
Auditing financial statements 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2014); Nguyen et al. 
(2014); Zakaria et al. (2014); Veprauskaite and 
Adams (2013); Jackling and Johl (2009); Setia-
Atmaja (2009); Mura (2007); 
Chiang and Lin (2007); Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008) 
15. Firm age 
 
 
 
Natural log of age of firm 
from date of incorporation. 
 
 
Public Disclosure Platform 
(www.kap.gov.tr) 
 
 
Nguyen et al. (2014); Zakaria et al. (2014); Ehikioya 
(2009); Jackling and Johl (2009); Singh and Gaur 
(2009); Setia-Atmaja (2009); Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) 
16. Firm size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural logarithm of the total 
assets owned by the firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditing financial statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2014); Nguyen et al. 
(2014); Zakaria et al. (2014); Veprauskaite and 
Adams (2013); Agrawal and Knoeber (2012); Guest 
(2009); Ehikioya (2009); Jackling and Johl (2009); 
Singh and Gaur (2009); Setia-Atmaja (2009); Perrini 
et al. (2008); Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008); 
Mura (2007); El Mehdi (2007); Chiang and Lin 
(2007); Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, (2006); 
Krishnan and Park (2005); Anderson and Reeb 
(2004); Tuschke and Sanders (2003) 
17. Industry 
 
 
 
 
Whether a firm is service or 
manufacturing firm. Equals 1 
if firms’ belongs to a 
manufacturing industry, 
otherwise 0. 
Public Disclosure Platform 
(www.kap.gov.tr) 
 
 
 
Ehikioya (2009); Setia-Atmaja (2009); Perrini et al. 
(2008) 
 
 
 
18. Group affiliation 
 
 
 
 
Whether a firm financials 
presents consolidated or 
stand-alone. Equals 1 if 
firms’ financials present 
consolidated, otherwise 0. 
Firms' annual reports  
 
 
 
 
Zattoni et al. (2009); Singh and Gaur (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 3. Variance inflation factors 
# Variables  VIF                  1/VIF 
1 CONCEN 2.72 0.37 
2 C-OWN 2.20 0.45 
3 F-OWN 1.30 0.77 
4 B-SIZE 1.39 0.72 
5 B-FML 1.21 0.83 
6 B-WMN 1.16 0.86 
7 B-EXE 1.31 0.76 
8 B-IND 1.05 0.95 
9 C_DUAL 1.33 0.75 
10 P-OWN 1.81 0.55 
11 CG-IND 1.21 0.83 
12 LEV 1.12 0.90 
13 AGE 1.17 0.86 
14 SIZE 2.12 0.47 
15 IND 1.30 0.77 
16 GRP 1.37 0.73 
Mean VIF 1.49 
 
 
